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How Countries Seek to Strengthen
Anti-Money Laundering Laws in
Response to the Panama Papers, and
the Ethical Implications of
Incentivizing Whistleblowers
Carmina Franchesca S. Del Mundo
Abstract:
The Panama Papers is currently the world’s largest whistleblower case that
involved 11.5 million leaked documents and over 214,000 offshore entities. It all
linked back to one Panamanian law firm, Mossack Fonseca. In 2016, over 400
investigative journalists collaboratively and simultaneously published stories
that exposed the money laundering and tax-evading schemes committed by the
rich and powerful. This included political figures and heads of states,
celebrities, sports figures, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups.
This article aims to dissect the innerworkings of Mossack Fonseca’s assetshielding strategy and investigate how the Panamanian law firm was able to
circumvent the tax and anti-money laundering laws of over 50 countries. We
will also examine the global responses to the Panama Papers, the proposed
reforms and strategies, and the obstacles to moving forward. Finally, this
article explores the ethical duties of lawyers, the significance of attorney-client
privilege, and the implications of monetarily incentivizing whistleblowers.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
The Panama Papers refer to the 11.5 million documents that an
anonymous source leaked to journalists in 2015. It exposed the fraudulent
and criminal activities committed by political figures, celebrities, sports
figures, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups.1 It is currently the
world’s largest whistleblower case, and as Edward Snowden2 describes it,
“the biggest leak in the history of data journalism.” 3 The documents
revealed financial records, email chains, and corporate filings associated
with more than 214,000 offshore holdings and tax havens, which all linked
back to one Panamanian law firm, Mossack Fonseca.4
It all started when journalist Bastian Obermayer of Germany’s
Süddeutsche Zeitung5 received a message from “John Doe,” the anonymous
source. At first, the story was going to be handled by only Bastian
Obermayer and Frederik Obermaier of Süddeutsche Zeitung.6 However,
they soon discovered that there were thousands of shell companies and over
forty years of records detailing how these offshore tax havens operated
under the radar.7 Therefore, the two journalists reached out to Gerard Ryle,
the director of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
(ICIJ), and as they delved deeper into the sea of leaked documents, it was
clear that they needed to expand their team.8
About 400 journalists from over eighty countries secretly collaborated

1
Luke Harding, Foreword to BASTIAN OBERMAYER & FREDERIK OBERMAIER, THE
PANAMA PAPERS: BREAKING THE STORY OF HOW THE RICH & POWERFUL HIDE THEIR MONEY,
at vii, viii (2016).
2
Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) employee, leaked
classified information to journalists in 2013 regarding the U.S. government’s global
surveillance operations, which consisted of surveillance and storage of communications data
of anyone within the United States or abroad. See generally JOURNALISM AFTER SNOWDEN:
THE FUTURE OF THE FREE PRESS IN THE SURVEILLANCE STATE (Emily Bell, Taylor Owen,
Smitha Khorana & Jennifer Henrichsen eds., 2017).
3
See front page of OBERMAYER, supra note 1.
4
Harding, supra note 1, at viii.
5
Süddeutsche Zeitung (translates to “South German Newspaper”) is one of Germany’s
largest daily newspapers. It won numerous awards for its investigative journalism and is
known to have spearheaded the Panama Papers investigation.
6
OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 10; note that Obermayer and Obermaier are not at all
related.
7
Gerard Ryle, How the Panama Papers Journalists Broke the Biggest Leak in History,
TED.COM: TEDSUMMIT (June 2016), https://www.ted.com/talks/gerard_ryle_
how_the_panama_papers_journalists_broke_the_biggest_leak_in_history?language=en#t776082.
8
OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 24. The International Club of Investigative Journalists
(ICIJ) is an initiative under the Center for Public Integrity (CPI) that encourages journalists
to share investigative material with each other when it is of international relevance. See
generally INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, https://www.icij.
org/about/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2019).
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and investigated the millions of leaked documents for over a year.9 They
agreed to simultaneously publish the story and expose the global pattern of
corruption and criminal activity on April 3, 2016.10 To protect the source’s
identity, the 400 journalists had agreed not to give the public access to the
entire database of leaked documents. The Panama Papers “spawned the
biggest journalism collaboration in history . . . [journalists were] working
shoulder to shoulder, sharing information, but telling no one.”11 The
journalists called it the “Panama Papers” as a “conscious echo of the
Pentagon Papers,” which were volumes of top-secret documents leaked by
Daniel Ellsberg in 1971 that “lifted the lid on the [United States (U.S.)]
War in Vietnam.”12
In response to the Panama Papers, numerous domestic and
international jurisdictions have looked to strengthening their laws to
regulate the criminal activities of tax evasion and money laundering.
However, in seeking to address this global issue, it seems that the call for
transparency and incentivizing whistleblowers could come at the expense of
preserving attorney-client privilege. This paper will compare the challenges
that many countries face in reforming Anti-Money Laundering (AML) laws
after the Panama Papers, as well as analyze the implications that these
proposed reforms have on legal ethics.
II. THE PANAMA PAPERS: THE GLOBAL SCALE OF
CORRUPTION
Mossack Fonseca,13 a Panamanian-based law firm with over forty
offices worldwide, became a “one-stop shop for all the asset-shielding
needs of the rich and powerful.”14 Its client-billings exceeded $42 million,
and a majority of its clients sought to evade taxes and conceal their
financial activities using offshore shell companies.15 The millions of leaked
documents linked back to 500 banks from all over the world, dozens of
dictators and heads of states, families of political figures and public
officials, celebrities, and even terrorist organizations.16 The Panama Papers
unearthed the tax-evasion tactics of the super wealthy—revealing how,
9

Harding, supra note 1, at ix.
Id.
11 Ryle, supra note 7; see also OBERMAYER supra note 1, at 24.
12 Harding, supra note 1, at viii-ix.
13 Mossack Fonseca was founded in 1986 by Jurgen Mossack, a German who grew up
and practiced law in Panama, and Ramón Fonseca, a Panamanian lawyer, politician and
author. See generally OBERMAYER supra note 1, at 25-31.
14
Joe Mont, Inside the Panama Papers, 13 COMPLIANCE WEEK 22, 24 (2016).
15 Will Fitzgibbon, Offshore Secrecy: Panama Papers Law Firm Mossack Fonseca
Closes its Doors, THE INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Mar.
14, 2018), https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/panama-papers-lawfirm-mossack-fonseca-closes-doors; see also Harding, supra note 1, at, vii.
16 Mont, supra note 14, at 24.
10
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through Mossack Fonseca, billions of dollars were “earned from arms, drug
and blood-diamond trafficking, and other illegal business[es].”17
A. Who were the True Clients?
A majority of Mossack Fonseca’s clients who were involved in
fraudulent activities and money laundering were politicians and heads of
states. The list includes:
[T]he prime ministers of Iceland18 and Pakistan; the king of Saudi
Arabia; Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko; $2 billion in
transactions connected to associates of Russian President Vladimir
Putin; and offshore companies linked to the family of Xi Jinping,
general secretary of China’s Communist Party. In Brazil, [Mossack
Fonseca was] entangled in “Operation Car Wash,”19 a bribery and
money laundering scandal that [involved] former president Luiz
Inacio Lula da Silva20 . . . and President Dilma Rousseff.21

Additionally, the then Argentinian President Cristina Kirschner was
involved with 123 shell companies to hide the $65 million she had
smuggled out of the country.22 Journalists also found links to FIFA, the
UEFA, and their respective presidents.23 There were connections to
“African dictators, Central American drug barons, convicted sex
17

OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 9.
The Prime Minister of Iceland was named “Businessman of the Year” before his
crimes came to surface; OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 315.
19 See, e.g., David Segal, Petrobras Oil Scandal Leaves Brazilians Lamenting a Lost
Dream, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/business/
international/effects-of-petrobras-scandal-leave-brazilians-lamenting-a-lost-dream.html
(This involved bribe payments to politicians through the gifting of Rolex watches, yachts,
and helicopters by construction and service-work companies that wanted to be contracted
with the state-run oil company, Petrobras).
20 Former President Lula da Silva negotiated his surrender with the police and is now
serving a 12-year prison sentence for corruption and money laundering; see Law and Justice
in Brazil: Lula Goes to Jail, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.economist.com/
the-americas/2018/04/08/lula-goes-to-jail.
21 Mont, supra note 14, at 24. Note that President Dilma Rousseff was impeached in
August 2016.
22 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 4. Many of these shell companies were actually found
in the United States—in the tax haven state of Nevada; see also J. Weston Phippen, Nevada,
a Tax Haven for Only $174: The Panama Papers Show How the U.S. State Has Become a
Favored Destination Rivaling the Cayman Islands and Switzerland, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 6,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/04/panama-papers-nevada/47699
4/ (In Nevada, there are “minimal reporting and disclosing requirements” and “stockholders
are not public record[s];” “The state offers tax benefits [and] also removes much of the
liability from the owner in case of a lawsuit.”).
23 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 315. FIFA stands for Fédération Internationale de
Football Association (French for “International Federation of Association Football”), which
is an organization that is known for major international football tournaments, such as the
World Cup. UEFA stands for the Union of European Football Associations.
18
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offenders,”24 mafia organizations, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda; each of these
entities were found to be associated with an offshore company that
Mossack Fonseca helped establish.25
B. How It Worked
With 140 politicians involved, including heads of state and elected
officials from more than fifty countries, 26 how did Mossack Fonseca keep
these fraudulent activities under the radar for many years? The key was to
create a complicated web of relationships among all parties involved to
camouflage any link between the law firm and the true beneficiaries.
Mossack Fonseca never worked directly with the true beneficial owners.
Instead, the “actual clients” on record were these intermediaries who were
often accountants, asset managers, bank representatives, or other lawyers.27
They were the ones ordering the “products,” paying the bills, and
communicating with Mossack Fonseca on behalf of the true beneficiaries.28
It starts with an intermediary contacting Mossack Fonseca to discuss
what the true owner was looking for, which was usually an offshore
company.29 Then, the firm offers offshore companies from a variety of
jurisdictions, “most frequently in the British Virgin Islands[,] Panama, . . .
the Bahamas, Bermuda, Samoa, Uruguay, Hong Kong, the [U.S.] tax
havens30 of Nevada, Wyoming[,] Delaware and . . . Florida and the
24

Id. at 59.
Id. at 59, 315.
26 Panama Papers: The Power Players, THE INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/the-powerplayers/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).
27 Harding, supra note 1, at viii.
28 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 12-13.
29 Id.
30 In the United States, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) was passed to help the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) access
bank records and facilitate investigations for money laundering. However, detecting and
investigating money laundering activities becomes a challenge when (1) in some states,
LLCs are not required to disclose the true beneficial owners, and (2) foreign sources of
income are not subject to U.S. taxes.
25

See Peter D. Hardy, Scott Michel and Fred Murray, Is the United States Still a Tax Haven?
The Government Acts on Tax Compliance and Money Laundering Risks, J. of Tax Prac. &
Proc. 25, 26 (June-July 2016) (“[T]he States of Nevada, Wyoming and Delaware, . . . allow
for the quick creation of limited liability companies (LLCs) without identifying the true
beneficial owners”). In the United States, incorporation is a state matter, not a federal issue.
Furthermore, according to IRS.gov, “foreign [sources of] income received by a nonresident
alien is not subject to U.S. taxation.” Therefore, money earned outside the United States are
not taxed. See also, Samuel Brunson, The U.S. as Tax Haven? Aiding Developing Countries
by Revoking the Revenue Rule, 5 COLUM. J. OF LAW 170, 178 (2016) (“For more than ninety
years, nonresident aliens and foreign corporations have owed no U.S. tax on interest they
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Netherlands.”31 An offshore company is then sold to the intermediary from
nearly fifty different offices worldwide.32 As Obermayer explains it,
A standard shell company costs the seller next to nothing and the
formalities are quickly dispatched. The buyer has his company in a
click of the fingers for only a few hundred [U.S.] dollars and can
dispose of it [quickly] and easily once it has served its purpose.
Also, no one will ever find out whom it belonged, which is ideal for
dodgy dealings.33

To ensure that there was a “protective screen” around the identities of
the true beneficiaries/owners, Mossack Fonseca would hire or “nominate”
individuals to act as “directors”34 of these new offshore companies. Their
job was to act as the true owners and sign all the necessary legal
documents.35
In reality, these “Nominee Directors” were only following orders from
Mossack Fonseca and the true owners of the company; they did not benefit
much from their role.36 In fact, “they are the exploited underclass of the
offshore world.”37 Many of them were working-class citizens who did not
even understand the documents that they were signing. David Cameron’s
late father, Ian, who had an offshore fund connected to Mossack Fonseca,
“hired a small army of Bahamas residents to sign paperwork, including a
part-time Bishop.”38
Another example is a 55-year-old Filipina housekeeper, Nesita
Manceau, who did everything required from an actual corporate director. 39
There also was Leticia Montoya Moran, a 63-year-old working-class
Panamanian who had a monthly salary of only $900, yet had sat as a
“corporate officer” and on boards of 10,969 companies.40 When confronted,
earn on bank deposits in U.S. banks. As a result, nonresidents hold hundreds of billions of
dollars in U.S. bank deposits. In addition, nonresident aliens and foreign corporations who
receive U.S.-source ‘portfolio interest’ owe no taxes on that interest, even though U.S.
persons holding the same securities would owe taxes on the interest.”).
31 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 12-13.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 14.
34
Also known as “Nominee Directors”. See OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 14-15.
35 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 14-15.
36 Id.; see also Tim Johnson, Did this Panama Papers Housekeeper Really Direct a
North Korean Arms Deal?, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (May 10, 2016 at 10:18 AM),
https://www. mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/article76635047.html.
37 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 324.
38
Harding, supra note 1, at viii; see also Juliette Garside, Fund Run by David
Cameron’s Father Avoided Paying Tax in Britain, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/04/panama-papers-davidcameron-father-tax-bahamas.
39 Johnson, supra note 36.
40 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 324.
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Montoya admits, “I have no idea what the companies are for, who they are
sold to, or what exactly they do.”41 As Jack Blum42 puts it, “[even] if you
waterboard [these Nominee Directors], they wouldn’t come up with the
name of the beneficial owner because they don’t know.”43
An example of this structure is Sergei Roldugin’s44 offshore company.
A Rossiya Bank representative held the power of attorney to conduct
business on Roldugin’s behalf and was the point of contact for a Zurichbased law firm.45 This Zurich-based law firm was an intermediary that
relayed the true owner’s (Roldugin’s) wishes to a Mossack Fonseca
subsidiary in Geneva.46 Through this complex web of relationships,
Mossack Fonseca therefore only needed to communicate with its Geneva
subsidiary. This structure is similar to the telephone game 47 children play
— effectively concealing the true identity of the beneficiary and owner.48
C. The Aftermath
Mossack Fonseca stated, in response to the leak, that it “merely
help[ed] incorporate companies” and that it had “conduct[ed] a thorough
due-diligence process” of every client it agreed to work with.49 It was not
until ten months after the leak that the Panamanian police arrested Jurgen
Mossack and Ramon Fonseca. 50 Although both faced money laundering
charges linked to the Petrobras bribery scandal, they both were released on
bail only a few months after their arrest.51 In March 2018, Mossack Fonseca
released a statement that it was to close all of its remaining offices due to
the “reputational deterioration” and “irreparable damage” caused by the

41

Id.
Jack Blum is a Washington D.C. lawyer who investigated offshore corporations and
money laundering schemes for decades.
43 Johnson, supra note 36.
44 Sergei Roldugin is a famous cellist, a godfather to the Russian President’s eldest
daughter, and Vladimir Putin’s best friend. He owned “a small stake” in Rossiya Bank,
which is private bank in St. Petersburg; see OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 7-19.
45 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 20.
46 Id.
47 The Telephone Game is where players form a line and pass down a message from one
end to the other by whispering the message to the player in front of them. The first player
comes up with a message, which is then whispered to the ear of the second player, then the
second player passes the same message to the third player, and so on—all until it reaches the
final player.
48 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 20.
49
Richard L. Cassin, Mossack Fonseca to Close Doors at End of Month, THE FCPA
BLOG (Mar. 16, 2018 at 8:22 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2018/3/16/mossackfonseca-to-close-doors-at-end-of-month.html; see also Due Diligence and “Know your
Customer,” MOSSACK FONSECA, http://mossfonmedia.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
50 Fitzgibbon, supra note 15.
51 Id.
42
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media.52
After the Panama Papers were released, and all the fraudulent
activities were disclosed around the world, the public began pressuring their
own governments to act. Several public officials eventually stepped down.
Several governments around the world conducted their own investigations,
which resulted in over $700 million in back taxes and fines—bringing
money back onshore.53 Many have also tried to strengthen their anti-moneylaundering laws. However, while these attempts may be seen as a step
forward, some reforms proposed in response to the Panama Papers have not
been successful or effective.
III. GLOBAL RESPONSES TO THE PANAMA PAPERS: PROPOSED
REFORMS & OBJECTIONS
In response to the Panama Papers, numerous domestic and
international jurisdictions looked to strengthening their laws to regulate the
criminal activity of money laundering. The necessity to address this issue
stems from the fact that offshore shell companies are not only being used
by the super-wealthy tax evaders, but also by criminal organizations and
terrorist groups.54 On the other hand, there are concerns that these types of
public disclosures could not only create national security issues and cause
political instability, but could also impact a client’s willingness to rely on
attorney-client privilege.55
A. The Need for Transparency
Transparency International56 calls for public registers of all beneficial
owners to restrict corrupt individuals from using secret trusts and
companies to hide illicit wealth.57 As Jose Ugaz, Chair of Transparency
International, stated, “world leaders must come together and ban the secret
companies that fuel grand corruption and allow the corrupt to benefit from
52

Id.
Cecile S. Gallego, Panama Papers Investigations Bring More Than $700 Million
Back Onshore, THE INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (June 26,
2018), https://www.icij.org/blog/2018/06/panama-papers-investigations-bring-700-millionback-onshore/.
54 See also Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of The Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Money
Laundering Regimes, 34.1 LAW AND POLICY IN INT’L BUS., 45 (2002).
55 See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Following the Money: Lessons from the
Panama Papers: Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 807 (2017).
56 Transparency International is a nongovernmental organization that “is committed to
advancing accountability, integrity and transparency”; See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
Our Accountability, https://www.transparency.org/ (“we aim to be an example of good
governance, ethical practice and openness to greater transparency.”)
57 Press Release, Transparency International Secretariat, Transparency International
Calls for Immediate Action by World Leaders to Stop Secret Companies, TRANSPARENCY
INT’L (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/transparency_
international_calls_for_immediate_action_by_world_leaders_to_s
53
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ill-gotten wealth.”58 The G20 promised to act59 and has supported measures
to increase the transparency of beneficial ownerships.60 However, not much
has been done to implement such reforms.
In 2014, the G20 countries adopted the “G20 High-Level Principles on
Beneficial Ownership Transparency.”61 Even before the Panama Papers, the
G20 “encourage[d] all countries to tackle the risks raised by the opacity of
legal persons and legal arrangements. . . . Improving the transparency of
legal persons and arrangements is important to protect the integrity and
transparency of the global financial system.”62 Since 2014, the G20
countries have not done much to improve their legal frameworks to
implement a system of transparency.
In particular, ten G20 countries and two G20 guest countries have
‘very weak’ legal frameworks when it comes to providing law
enforcement, tax authorities and financial intelligent units with
access to any beneficial ownership information. The UK is the only
G20 country to have established a central register of beneficial
ownership information that is publicly available. . . . Argentina,
India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey have not
significantly improved their framework since 2015.63

Nevertheless, there has been a trend towards “entity transparency,”
which aims to target money laundering, consumer fraud, tax fraud, and
other criminal activities.64
1. Panama
On April 29, 2016, soon after the release of the Panama Papers,
Panamanian President Juan Carols Varela Rodriguez, through an Executive
Decree, established the Committee of Independent Experts—an
independent committee that was mandated to formulate recommendations
“to achieve transparency objectives required by the international
community.”65 According to the Ambassador of the Republic of Panama to
58

Id.
OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 20.
60 Transparency International Secretariat, supra note 57.
61 See G20 High-Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency, G20
Australia (2014), https://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/AntiCorruption/ Documents/
G20High-LevelPrinciplesOnBeneficialOwnershipTransparency.pdf.
62 Id.
63 Press Release, Transparency International Secretariat, G20 Countries Moving Too
Slowly to Combat Financial Crime, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.
transparency.org/news/pressrelease/g20_countries_moving_too_slowly_to_combat_financia
l_crime.
64 See generally Jenik Radon & Mahima Achuthan, Beneficial Ownership Disclosure:
The Cure for the Panama Papers Ills. 70.2 J. OF INT’L AFFAIRS, 85 (2017).
65 Committee of Independent Experts, Final Report (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.
59
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Washington, D.C., Emanuel Gonzalez-Revilla, the committee is expected to
“deliver nothing less than an honest, accurate, and independent assessment
of Panama’s system and how it can better promote transparency.”66 The
Committee eventually released a report, recommending that:
Panama achieve a high standard in transparency and effective
control of illicit flows, while retaining its competitiveness as a
financial, service and domiciliary center of international
organizations and remain off any discriminatory list or qualification
of opacity or lack of transparency. Achieving these goals will require
investment, legislation and a high degree of commitment by the
authorities and regulatory bodies of Panama, and require the
strengthening of the control and reporting systems for the different
productive sectors of the country and all organizations that are
domiciled in Panama.67

The Committee also recommended the Financial Intelligence Unit and
the Panamanian judicial system to be completely independent and free from
the influence of other powers of the State.68 The report further attempted to
balance the need to implement stronger international transparency standards
with the maintenance of Panama’s competitive international financial
services.69
Since the release of the Panama Papers, Panamanian authorities closed
down more than 275,000 offshore companies and have “sanctioned
delinquent offshore companies with financial penalties.”70 As part of the
effort, budgets for financial regulatory agencies have also been raised.71
Furthermore, the government also implemented “Operation Patria” to
reduce organized crime and illicit cash flows.72 In the following statement,
President Varela reaffirmed his commitment to transparency:
presidencia.gob.pa/tmp/file/1503/INDEPENDENT%20EXPERT%20COMMITTEE.pdf.
66 Emanuel Gonzalez-Revilla, Panama Ambassador to U.S.: Our Transparency
Commitment Remains Strong, TIME (Aug. 14, 2016), http://time.com/4450180/panamastransparency-commitment/.
67 Bruce Zagaris, Panama Committee of Independent Experts Issues Report On
Improving Transparency, 32 NO. 12 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 471 (2016).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Will Fitzgibbon, The Biggest Change After the Panama Papers? The One Inside
People’s Heads, THE INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3,
2018), https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/biggest-change-panamapapers-one-inside-peoples-heads/.
71 Hugh Bronstein, Panama Needs New Anti-Corruption Laws to Combat Tax Dodgers:
Panel, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-panama-tax/panamaneeds-new-anti-corruption-laws-to-combat-tax-dodgers-panel-idUSKBN13H08H.
72 Press Release, Government implements “Operation Patria” to reduce organized
crime and traffic of illicit substances, THE MINISTRY OF THE PRESIDENCY (Oct. 20, 2015),
https://www.presidencia.gob.pa/en/News/Government-implements-Operation-Patria-toreduce-organized-crime-and-traffic-of-illicit-substances-.
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In the 21 months of my administration, we had already improved our
international reporting standards and introduced ‘know your client’
regulations for law firms that register corporations. . . . Panama is
fully committed to bilateral automatic information exchange as part
of our efforts to promote greater financial and legal transparency.73

While Panama has shown its commitment, there is still much to be
done.
2. The United States
On May 6, 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama74 announced that the
United States intended on passing initiatives on tax and entity transparency.
He called for a “Reciprocal Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act”
(Reciprocal FATCA) which aims to strengthen the ability of the United
States government to work with other countries to fight tax evasion through
full reciprocity.75 Since 2010, FATCA required foreign banks to tell the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) about American-held accounts.76 A
“Reciprocal” FATCA would encourage transnational cooperation by
requiring the United States to engage in the automatic information
exchange.
On November 13, 2018, Singapore signed a Tax Information
Exchange Agreement (TIEA) and a Reciprocal FATCA Model 1
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) with the United States.77 The purpose
73 Juan Carlos Varela, President of Panama: Embrace Transparency to Fight
Corruption, TIME (May 1, 2016), http://time.com/4312546/president-of-panama-trans
parency/.
74 In July 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (PUB. L. NO. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010)),
hereinafter “Dodd Frank,” which is over 2,300 pages long, and includes numerous
provisions to help prevent and expose fraud and corruption.
75 Bruce Zagaris, President Obama Announces Initiatives on Tax and Entity
Transparency, Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Corruption, 32 No. 5 INT’L ENFORCEMENT
L. REP. 176 (2016).
76 Joe Pinsker, Governments Don’t Stand a Chance Against Rich People Who Don’t
Like Taxes, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2017/11/paradise-papers-panama-taxes/545198/. See also, Internal Revenue Service,
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
corporations/foreign-account-tax-compliance-act-fatca (last updated Feb. 28, 2019) (“The
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), which was passed as part of the HIRE Act
[Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act], generally requires that foreign financial
Institutions and certain other non-financial foreign entities report on the foreign assets held
by their U.S. account holders or be subject to withholding on withholdable payments. The
HIRE Act also contained legislation requiring U.S. persons to report, depending on the
value, their foreign financial accounts and foreign assets.”).
77 Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Singapore and the
Government of the United States of America to Improve International Tax Compliance and
to Implement FATCA, Sing.-U.S., Nov. 13, 2018, accessible via INLAND REVENUE
AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE (IRAS.GOV) https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/uploadedFiles/
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was to “improve international tax compliance through mutual assistance in
tax matters based on an effective infrastructure for the automatic exchange
of information.”78 The Agreement states:
The Government of the United States acknowledges the need to
achieve equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information
exchange with Singapore . . . . [T]he United States is committed to
further improve transparency and enhance the exchange relationship
with Singapore by pursuing the adoption of regulations and
advocating and supporting relevant legislation to achieve such
equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information exchange.79

Although the agreement was recently signed, it has not yet been
ratified, and therefore, it currently does not have the force of law.80
Nevertheless, it is a step towards cross-border collaboration.
Furthermore, on May 6, 2016, President Obama also called on
Congress to step up; there had been eight tax treaties that the Senate had not
passed for years, which could give the government stronger tools to
investigate American offshore accounts.81 On February 6, 2018, the Senate
held a Judicial Committee hearing on “Beneficial Ownership: Fighting
Illicit International Financial Networks Through Transparency.”82 There
was a proposal to create a registry of beneficial owners, which may be a
“pragmatic and necessary step to combat money laundering.”83 This bill,
IRASHome/Quick_Links/International_Tax/Singapore-US%20FATCA%
20Model%201A%20IGA.pdf.
78 Id.
79
Id.
80 Id.(“This Agreement shall enter into force on January 1 of the calendar year next
following the later of (1) the date of entry into force of the TIEA and (2) the date of the last
notification of an exchange of written notifications between the United States and Singapore
confirming the completion of each Party’s necessary internal procedures for entry into force
of this Agreement”); see also Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, Singapore and The
United States of America Signed Agreements for Exchange of Information, IRAS.GOV (Nov.
16, 2018), https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/News-and-Events/Newsroom/Media-Release sand-Speeches/Media-Releases/2018/Singapore-and-The-United-States-of-America -SignedAgreements-for-Exchange-of-Information/ (“The signing took place in Singapore, between
Deputy Secretary (Planning) of the Singapore Ministry of Finance, Yee Ping Yi, and the
United States of America Chargé d’Affaires to Singapore, Stephanie Faye SyptakRamnath.”).
81 Tanya Somanader, President Obama’s Efforts on Financial Transparency and AntiCorruption: What You Need to Know, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 6, 2016, 9:24 AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/05/06/ president-obamas-efforts-promotefinancial-transparency-and-combat-corruption-what.
82
Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Senate Holds Hearing on Beneficial Ownership: Fighting Illicit
International Financial Networks Through Transparency, 32 NO. 2 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L.
REP. 50 (2018).
83 Id. (“Under the TITLE Act, every state must collect the name, residential or business
address, and a unique identifying number from a passport, state driver’s license or state
identification card for each beneficial owner of a corporation or limited liability company at
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known as the True Incorporation for Transparency for Law Enforcement
Act (TITLE Act), allows for both civil and criminal penalties, such as a
fine, a prison term for up to three years, or both, when an individual has
provided false or fraudulent beneficial ownership information, or has
willfully failed to provide complete or updated beneficial ownership
information.84 However, there were many concerns raised during the
judicial hearing about these proposed bills on transparency.85 On one hand,
there was Senator Mike Lee, who had concerns about the impact on free
speech.86 Along his side was Brian O’Shea,87 who raised concerns about the
failure of the TITLE Act to adequately protect privacy rights and prevent
the misuse of information that would be available to several people.88 On
the opposite end was Senator Sheldon Whitehouse who argued that U.S.
secrecy only weakens U.S. national security overall.89
The American Bar Association (ABA) also opposes the proposed
Beneficial Ownership Transparency Reform.90 One of the major objections
of the ABA is the impingement on lawyer-client confidentiality and the
undermining of attorney-client privilege.91 While the ABA “supports
reasonable and necessary domestic and international measures to fight these
illicit activities,” the TITLE Act would reclassify lawyers as “formation
agents” under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)—thereby subjecting them to the
the time it is created.”).
84 True Incorporation Transparency for Law Enforcement Act or the TITLE Act
(S.1454), CONGRESS.GOV (June 28, 2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/
senate-bill/1454.
85 In addition to the True Incorporation for Transparency for Law Enforcement Act,
which is also known as the TITLE Act (S. 1454), another pending bill that was discussed
was the Corporate Transparency Act (H.R. 3089/S.1717); see Zagaris, supra note 82 (Unlike
the TITLE Act, “the Corporate Transparency Act (H.R.3089/S.1717) does not require states
to collect beneficial ownership information. Instead, it requires the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to collect the name, residential or business address, and a
unique identifying number from a passport, state driver’s license or state identification card
for each beneficial owner of a corporation or limited liability company at the time it is
created unless the state in which the company is formed chooses to collect the relevant
information as set forth in the statute.”).
86 Zagaris, supra note 82.
87 Brian O’Shea is Senior Director of the Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness at
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Washington, D.C.
88 Zagaris, supra note 82 (Clay Fuller of the American Enterprise Institute in
Washington, D.C. also testified).
89 Id.
90 See Matthew Stephenson, Why Does the American Bar Association Oppose Beneficial
Ownership Transparency Reform?, THE GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2018/02/06/why-does-the-american-bar-associationoppose-beneficial-ownership-transparency-reform/.
91 Press Release, ABA Sends Letter to Senate Judiciary Committee Opposing S. 1454,
Anti-Money Laundering Bill, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Feb. 02, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2018/02/aba_sends_
letterto/.
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BSA’s suspicious activity reporting (SAR) requirements. 92 In other words,
the TITLE Act “would compel lawyers to report certain privileged or
confidential client information to government authorities . . . under penalty
of harsh civil and criminal sanctions.”93 Another reason for the opposition
is the cost of compliance; “it would impose burdensome, costly, and
unworkable new regulatory burdens on small business.”94
The ABA further argues that the TITLE Act seems duplicative and
unnecessary because the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
already issued a new Customer Due Diligence Rule (in effect in May
2018).95 This rule requires financial institutions “to collect certain specific
beneficial ownership information regarding entities that establish new bank
accounts” and provide access to federal law enforcement.96 FinCEN’s
Customer Due Diligence Rule has four core elements:
(1) customer identification and verification, (2) beneficial ownership
identification and verification, (3) understanding the nature and
purpose of customer relationships to develop a customer risk profile,
and (4) ongoing monitoring for reporting suspicious transactions and
maintaining and updating customer information.97

Although it looks like a good start, it is not enough. Former Michigan
Senator Carl Levin explains that this FinCEN Rule was a “significant step
backward from current practice” because it was still quite limited and did
not go far enough to prevent “terrorists, money launderers, tax evaders and
other wrongdoers” from anonymously misusing financial institutions.98
92
Letter to Senate Judiciary Committee, Hilarie Bass, Hearing on ‘Beneficial
Ownership: Fighting Illicit International Financial Networks Through Transparency” and
Concerns Regarding S. 1454, the “True Incorporation Transparency for Law Enforcement
(TITLE) Act,’ and Other Similar Legislation, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Feb. 01, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/1feb2018-abalettertosjco
pposings1454.authcheckdam. pdf (“In particular, the ABA opposes the provisions of the
[TITLE Act] that would regulate many lawyers and law firms as financial institutions under
the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) when they help clients to establish small corporations and
limited liability companies (LLCs). . . . Under the bill, lawyers and law firms that help
clients to form small corporations or LLCs would be considered “formation agents” (and
hence a new category of “financial institution”) under the BSA and would be subject to the
strict AML and SAR requirements of the BSA. These SAR requirements would compel
lawyers to report certain privileged or confidential client information to government
authorities.”).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96
Id.
97 Alyssa Marchetti, Stricter Anti-Money Laundering Rules for Financial Institutions, 36
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 30, 33 (2016) (citing Customer Due Diligence Requirements for
Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,398, 29,398 (May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, and 1026)).
98 Marchetti, supra note 97 (citing Evan Weinberger, Obama’s Moves to Eliminate Shell
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Janis Meyer, a professional liability partner at Hinshaw & Culbertson,
further explains that “[w]hile large firms typically do have systems in place
to alert them if a potential client has been flagged by a law enforcement
agency, every jurisdiction has its own rules regarding what kind of due
diligence is mandatory.”99
While there has been disagreement as to how to reform the laws to
address the problem of tax evasion and money laundering, the United States
investigation of the Panama Papers, at the very least, seems to be moving
forward. On December 4, 2018, four men were criminally charged in the
United States for their involvement with the Panama Papers and Mossack
Fonseca.100 Each of these four men were “charged with wire fraud, tax
fraud, money laundering, and other crimes.”101 “Wire fraud can carry a jail
term of 20 years.”102
Among these four men were Ramses Owens, a Panamanian attorney
who worked for Mossack Fonseca, and Dirk Brauer, who was a German
investment manager for Mossfon Asset Management, a Mossack Fonseca
affiliate.103 Investigators discovered that both Owens and Brauer had
established and managed “sham foundations, opaque offshore trusts and
undeclared bank accounts” to assist Mossack Fonseca’s American clients in
concealing their income from United States tax authorities.104 American
clients were advised how to illegally bring money into the United States
from their offshore accounts through “specially created debit cards and [by]
falsely claiming [that] the money had come from the sale of companies.”105
In addition to these two were Richard Gaffey, an American
accountant, and Harald Joachim von der Goltz, a former Mossack Fonseca
client and former United States resident.106 Von der Goltz falsely claimed
Companies Easy to Evade, LAW360 (May 6, 2016, 7:04 PM), http://www.law
360.com/articles/793365/obama-s-moves-to-eliminate-shell-companies-easy-to-evade).
99 Nell Gluckman, Law Firms Look for Lessons—and Clients—in Panama Papers Leak,
THE AM. LAW. LITIG. DAILY (May 12, 2016), https://www.sheppardmullin.com/media/
article/1506_Panama%20Papers.pdf.
100 Jon Swaine & Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Panama Papers Investigation: Four Men
Criminally Charged in US: Prosecutors Say Quartet Went to ‘Extraordinary Lengths to
Circumvent US Tax Laws’ to Boost the Wealth of Their Clients, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 4,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/04/panama-papers-investigation-fourmen-charged-us.
101 Id.
102 Panama Papers: Four Charged in US With Fraud and Tax Evasion, BCC NEWS
(Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46449696.
103 Swaine & Kirchgaessner, supra note 100; “Mossfon” is short for Mossack Fonseca.
See also Jesse Drucker, U.S. Prosecutors Bring Their First Charges Over the Panama
Papers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/
business/panama-papers-indictment.html.
104 Swaine & Kirchgaessner, supra note 100.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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that his Guatemalan mother was the actual owner of his offshore
holdings.107 In connection with these four men, German authorities had
deployed about “170 police officers, prosecutors, and tax inspectors” to
investigate “six Deutsche Bank offices around Frankfurt,” specifically two
bank employees who allegedly assisted in the establishment of these
offshore shell companies and helped clients launder money.108 This comes
to show that a transnational collaborative effort is imperative in the
investigation of the Panama Papers, as well as in tackling the global
problem of money laundering, tax evasion, and other related fraudulent
activities.
This is the first criminal prosecution that has developed from the
Panama Papers in the United States. As Brian Benczkowski, an assistant
attorney general, stated, “[t]he charges announced today demonstrate our
commitment to prosecute professionals who facilitate financial crime across
international borders and the tax cheats who utilize their services.”109 While
the proposed legislative and administrative reforms have not been so
successful, the prosecution of these four men at least demonstrates to the
public and to the international community that the United States is still
dedicated to deterring money laundering and tax evasion schemes.
3. The European Union
The European Union (E.U.) sought to amend its Anti-Money
Laundering Directive (AMLD) to address the illegal and fraudulent use of
offshore shell companies. It required the E.U. Member States to strengthen
their laws regarding the disclosure of beneficial owners, create a shared
registry of beneficial owners, and implement penalties for
noncompliance.110 It was a push towards a more multilateral framework to
better fight the global problem of corruption.
Because each E.U. Member State had different policies, definitions,
and sanctions regarding money laundering violations, it was harder to hold
criminals accountable. Therefore, to effect cross-border cooperation, both
judicially and through law enforcement, it was important to create a
multilateral agreement among the Member States. The amended AMLD not
only allowed for the exchange and sharing of information among Member
States, but it also created more uniform rules, especially because “[t]hese
differences in legal frameworks can also be exploited by criminals and
terrorists who could carry out financial transactions where they perceive
107

Id.
Id.
109 Id.
110 Nicholas Vail, Cracking Shells: The Panama Papers & Looking to the European
Union’s Anti-Money Laundering Directive as a Framework for Implementing a Multilateral
Agreement to Combat the Harmful Effects of Shell Companies, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 133,
134-135 (2018).
108

103

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

40:87 (2019)

anti-money laundering measures to be weakest.”111
For example, Article 18 of the fourth amended AML Directive
(4AMLD) requires the application of “enhanced customer due diligence
(ECDD) measures when dealing with natural or legal entities established in
high risk third countries.”112 Article 12 of the 4AMLD also addressed the
use of online prepaid cards by lowering the thresholds (from 250 to 150
EUR) to which ECDD measures would apply.113 “Limiting the anonymity
of prepaid instruments will incentivize using such instruments for
legitimate purposes only, and will decrease their attractiveness for terrorist
and criminal purposes.”114 Also, Article 30 and 31 of the 4AMLD included
rules regarding the collection, storing, and access to information on the
ultimate beneficiaries/owners of companies.115
Furthermore, on June 8, 2016, the European Parliament decided to set
up an inquiry committee, known as the PANA Committee,116 to investigate
and “acquire more detailed information on offshore companies and their
ultimate beneficiaries.”117 The European Union was the “first regional
organization to adopt a comprehensive [Anti-Money Laundering and
Counter-Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF)] regulatory framework.” 118
However, while these efforts have been strong, there are still
implementation issues and problematic inconsistencies. The definition of
money laundering under E.U. law has expanded through several
amendments, but much more needs to be done in the synchronization of
111

Security Union: Proposal for a Directive on Countering Money Laundering by
Criminal Law – Questions & Answers, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Dec. 21, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-16-4452en.htm.
112 Bruce Zagaris, EU Reaches Agreement on Amendments to the 4th Anti-Money
Laundering Directive, 33 No. 12 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 444 (2017).
113 Id. at 112-13.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See generally Michael Plachta, European Parliament Sets Up an Inquiry Committee
into “Panama Papers”, 32 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REPORTER 221-222 (2016).
117 Michael Plachta, European Parliament Adopts Report, Recommendations in the
“Panama Papers” Affair, 33 No. 11 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REPORTER 398 (2017). See
generally EUR. PARL.-POL’Y DEP’T ON BUDGETARY AFF., THE IMPACT OF SCHEMES
REVEALED BY THE PANAMA PAPERS ON THE ECONOMY AND FINANCES OF A SAMPLE OF
MEMBER STATES (2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/
572717/IPOL_STU(2017)572717_EN.pdf (“Upon request by the European Parliament’s
Committee of Inquiry [PANA Committee] to investigate alleged contraventions and
maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to money laundering, tax
avoidance and tax evasion . . ., this study assesses the impacts of the schemes revealed by
the Panama Papers, a set of documents leaked from the law firm Mossack Fonseca detailing
tax evasion and avoidance practices, and published by the International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) in April 2016.”).
118 Leonardo Borlini & Francesco Montanaro, The Evolution of The EU Law Against
Criminal Finance: The “Hardening” Of FATF Standards Within The EU, 48.4 GEO. J. OF
INT’L L., 1009, 1030 (2017).

104

How Countries Seek to Strengthen Anti-Money Laundering Laws
40:87 (2019)

enforcement efforts.119
4. Germany
On April 11, 2016, several days after the Panama Papers were
disclosed globally, Germany’s Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble,
published an “Action Plan against Tax Fraud, Tax Avoidance Schemes and
Money Laundering – 10 Next Steps for a Fair International Tax System and
a More Effective Combat Against Money Laundering.”120 In addition to
urging countries to work together by closely coordinating with the E.U. and
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the
goal was to also convert some of the key points from this Action Plan into
legislative proposals to the German Parliament. 121
First, Germany urged Panama to cooperate by providing an “automatic
exchange of information” and requiring “full transparency,” such that
“[s]hareholders or managers must be obliged to provide proof on a regular
basis of the economic activities that their company performs.”122 Second, to
implement a more global and collaborative solution, the OECD would need
to create uniform criteria to harmonize national and international
blacklists.123 Germany suggested that the Europeans will be taking the lead
in creating such joint list.124
Third, “the new standard for the automatic exchange of information on
tax matters” should not only involve 100 countries, but instead, there must
be a collective effort to “increase the pressure” on other countries in order
“to make sure that offering a haven for illicit earnings is no longer worth
it.”125 Schäuble recognized the global impact of money laundering, and the
necessity of establishing a global collaborative effort to curtail fraudulent
and tax-evasion schemes.
Fourth, there is a need for a mechanism to monitor the automatic
exchange of information among countries.126 Although establishing a
system to monitor the transnational exchange of information may be
expensive, collaboration could expedite investigations and create greater
obstacles for those seeking to engage in money laundering. Fifth, global
119

Id. at 1031.
Press Release, Fighting effectively against tax cheating, devious tax avoidance and
money laundering, FEDERAL MINISTRY OF FINANCE (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.bundes
finanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Topics/Taxation/Articles/2016-04-12-10points-plan.html.
121 Joerg Brodersen, Thomas Eckhardt & Christian Ehlermann, Germany’s Ten-Point
Plan Against Tax Fraud, Avoidance Schemes, Money Laundering, 27.7 J. OF INT’L TAX’N 6
(2016).
122 Press Release, supra note 120.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
120
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registers of beneficial owners are needed to effect more transparency on a
global scale, which has already been agreed within the E.U. Member States
through the AMLD.127 Sixth, a systematic link among national registers
should be established to perform data comparisons and create a stronger
global effort in tracking down corrupt and fraudulent financial activities.128
Seventh, while banks are already subject to criminal sanctions if they
support the tax evasion schemes of their clients, firms that offer tax-saving
models should also be subjected to disclosure obligations.129 Eighth,
companies can and should be held responsible to a greater degree even if
the criminal activity was done independently by an employee working as an
agent of the institution.130 This would incentivize institutions to take a more
supervisory role of their employees, and to require employees to conduct
more thorough investigative due diligence of potential clients.
Ninth, tax evaders should not be able to avoid punishment and escape
sanctions through “limitation periods” (i.e., statute of limitations), but
instead, “limitation periods” should only start to run once the tax evader has
“fulfilled the (existing and new) reporting obligations for foreign
relations.”131 Finally, Germany will be establishing strict AML measures
and “require a legal initiative to enhance the skimming-off of profits from
illegal transactions as well as introducing tougher sanctions and making it
easier to freeze assets.”132
In addition to the Action Plan, the German Federal Criminal Police
Office (also known as “BKA” or Bundeskriminalamt in German) has been
persistent in tracking down German-based criminals and fraudsters linked
to the Panama Papers; the BKA wanted access to the complete database of
leaked documents that only a selected number of journalists have access
to.133 However, to protect its anonymous source, Süddeutsche Zeitung had
refused to hand over a copy of the Panama Papers to German officials.
Nonetheless, the German Federal Criminal Police Office was able to
purchase a copy of the 11.5 million leaked documents for 5 million EUR
from an anonymous source.134 While payment for the leaked documents in
this instance did not go directly to the whistleblower, there seems to be
greater ethical implications if whistleblowers are monetarily incentivized.

127

Id.
Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Panama Papers: Germany ‘Pays Millions’ for Leaked Data, BBC NEWS (July 5,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40505300.
134 Id.
128
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IV. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WHISTLEBLOWING
Many offshore tax havens, several of which were former British
colonies, have been practicing the British common laws’ “banking secrecy
rules” where a banker owed its client an implied contractual duty of
confidentiality, and thereby, maintaining assets in strict secrecy.135 While
most countries do offer a similar kind of duty to their clients, the main
distinction is that these offshore havens “will not breach their wall of
secrecy even when a major violation of another nation’s laws may be
involved”; they assert that their municipal law prohibits the breach of
confidentiality.136
In response to the Panama Papers leak, the Panama National Bar
Association (PNBA) issued a communiqué.137 It deemed the disclosures as
“unlawful, both the theft of correspondence as well as the non-authorized
disclosure of attorney-client communications.”138 The PNBA also called for
increased prison sentences to those who violate the infringement of
privacy.139
A. Incentivizing Whistleblowers
While most offshore havens strongly disincentivize whistleblowing,
there are other countries that have laid out incentives and protections for
whistleblowers. In the United States, a whistleblower who voluntarily
provides information to the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC)
which successfully leads to SEC enforcement or “administrative action in
which the SEC obtains monetary sanctions totaling more than $1,000,000
may receive an award equal to between 10% and 30% of the monetary
sanctions collected by the SEC.”140 On May 24, 2016, the SEC announced
that it “will jointly award more than $450,000 to two individuals for a tip
that led the agency to open a corporate accounting investigation and for
their assistance once the investigation was underway.”141 As Edward
135 Reid K. Weisbord, A Catharsis for U.S. Trust Law: American Reflections on the
Panama Papers, 116 COLUM. L. REV. Online 93, 103 (2016) (quoting Douglas J. Workman,
The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Criminally Evading Income Taxes, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675, 679 (1982)).
136 Workman, supra note 135, at 679.
137 Bruce Zagaris, Panama Bar Association Reacts to Panama Papers, 32.5 INT’L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 180 (2016).
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Amy Deen Westbook, Cash for Your Conscience: Do Whistleblower Incentives
Improve Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097,
1122 (2018) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(d) (2018) (“The
SEC rules permit aggregation of multiple SEC cases that arise out of a common nucleus of
operative facts.”).
141 Jaclyn Jaeger, SEC Awards Two More Whistleblowers, COMPLIANCE WEEK (May 24,
2016), https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/enforcement-action/sec-awards-54m-to-two
-whistleblowers#.WR8rOJRdPY.
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Snowden puts it, unveiling corruption “doesn’t happen by itself.”142 Still,
while whistleblowing helps reveal corruption, there are ethical implications
of monetarily incentivizing whistleblowers.
A lot is at stake when someone “blows the whistle.” Yet, the
anonymous source behind the Panama Papers, as well as Edward Snowden,
did not seek monetary compensation.143 Without a personally-driven
incentive, it is easier to understand the motives of a whistleblower. The
individual behind the Panama Papers, John Doe, was more motivated by
“the scale of injustice that the documents would reveal.”144
‘I do not work for any government or intelligence agency, directly or
as a contractor, and I never have,’ [John Doe] wrote in his manifesto
. . . . ‘My viewpoint is entirely my own, as was my decision to share
the documents with Süddeutsche Zeitung and the International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists, not for any specific political
purpose, but simply because I understood enough about their
contents to [realize] the scale of the injustices they described.’145

Furthermore, journalists from Süddeutsche Zeitung, including
Obermayer and Obermaier, “never [pay] for information, not only because
[they] don’t have the money, but primarily on principle. This also reduces
people’s temptation to fob [them] off with fake documents.”146 It is already
challenging to ascertain the true motives of a whistleblower, but it is even
more complicated when money is involved. On one hand, potential
whistleblowers fear for their safety and job security, which is likely why
money could be an incentive. However, monetary incentives could also
influence individuals with bad motives.
It seems like the real incentive should be a form of actual protection.
“Whistle-Blowers aren’t particularly well protected, even in Germany, and
each person who knows an informant’s identity is a potential risk—even, or
perhaps especially, if that person is a journalist.”147 Furthermore, job
security and reputations are at stake, because no company would want to
hire an employee who is known to whistle-blow.148 Reputations are at stake
142 Tamsyn Burgmann, Panama Papers Leaks Show Change Doesn’t Happen by Itself,
Says Edward Snowden, THE CANADIAN PRESS (Apr. 6, 2016).
143 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 3.
144 Ryle, supra note 7.
145 Boer Deng Washington, Panama Tax Whistleblower Steps Forward, TIMES (London),
May 7, 2016, at 22.
146
OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 4.
147 Id. at 3.
148 See Zizi Petkova, Interpreting the Anti-Retaliation Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act,
18.2 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 573, 574-76 (In response to the 2008 market crash, Congress tried to
expand the whistleblower protections in the Dodd-Frank Act to include both internal and
external disclosures. However, “the statute has presented an inherent ambiguity in
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because if you attach your name to the whistleblowing, everyone will
know, including your current and future clients and colleagues. In addition
to professional insecurity, one’s life could also be in danger. As such, it is
quite unenticing for people to come forward, even if money is involved.
B. Ethical Duties of Lawyers
The purpose of securities laws like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA)149 is to “substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus . . . achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry.”150 Congress designed the FCPA
as a “strong anti-bribery law . . . urgently needed to bring these corrupt
practices to a halt and to restore public confidence in the integrity of the
American business system.”151 In the United States, attorneys use the
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct as
a guide. While the Model Rules are not “law” per se, many states have
adopted these rules along with their own statues on legal ethics.
There are times when the ABA Model Rules conflict with the FCPA
or other securities regulations. Conflict between these rules may arise when
an attorney must make disclosures to the Department of Justice or the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) about a client, but such
information is usually protected by attorney-client privilege. An example is
the FCPA requirement for lawyers to make certain financial disclosures to
the SEC.152
Under ABA Model Rule 1.8., “a lawyer shall not use information
relating to the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client
unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by
these rules.”153 Monetarily incentivizing whistleblowers lawyers is a
violation of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to its client, per Rule 1.8. Not only
is the whistleblower lawyer using information to the disadvantage of its
client, but it is also used against the client for the whistleblower’s own
delineating who is protected from employer retaliation after blowing the whistle. . . . Read in
isolation, the whistleblower definition seems to indicate that only disclosures to the [SEC]
are protected . . . . The SEC ruled that while the narrow definition applies to whistleblowers
seeking monetary awards, the anti-retaliation provisions covers three classes of
whistleblowers, including those who make internal disclosures.”; However, some circuits,
like “the Fifth Circuit[,] [have] refused to defer to the SEC interpretation and [have] limited
the anti-retaliation protection exclusively to external disclosures.”); see also Asadi v. G.E.
Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
149 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was implemented in 1977.
150 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
151
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPROVED DISCLOSURE ACTS OF 1977, S. REP. NO.
95-114, at 4 (1977).
152 William Alan Nelson, II, Attorney Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Legal and Ethical Challenges and Solutions, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 255, 270 (2009).
153 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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advantage (monetary compensation for whistleblowing). However, it all
goes back to the “crime and fraud” exception of 1.6:
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . (2)
to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another . . . 154

Even though there is a definite conflict of interest here, disclosing
under these exceptions could make the lawyer immune to a Rule 1.8
violation. However, that immunity might not stand if the primary
motivation for establishing an attorney-client relationship and disclosing
confidential and/or privileged information is to acquire a monetary reward
for whistleblowing. Furthermore, although Rule 1.6(b)(2) does not
automatically “require” the lawyer to reveal the client’s misconduct,155 the
lawyer may not counsel or assist a client in furtherance of criminal or
fraudulent activities—which is different from what Mossack Fonseca did.156
Under Rule 1.16, “a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a
client if . . . the representation will result in violation of the rules of
professional conduct or other law.”157
If there are laws that supersede the ABA Model Rules that require
disclosure (e.g., SEC, FCPA, or other federal law), then the lawyer must
comply with the law and disclose.158 Furthermore, Mossack Fonseca
attorneys, if licensed to conduct legal services in the United States, would
have also violated Rule 1.4(a)(5), where a lawyer shall “consult with the
client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct” when it is
clear that the client “expects assistance not permitted by the Rules . . . or

154 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)(emphasis
added).
155 The diction of the rule uses the phrase “may reveal,” as opposed to “should.”
156 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,
but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a
client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law.”). If lawyers who worked for and with Mossack
Fonseca had a law license in the United States, violation of these rules could result in
disbarment.
157
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
158 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“When
disclosure of information relating to the representation appears to be required by other law,
the lawyer must discuss the matter with the client to the extent required by Rule 1.4. If,
however, the other law supersedes this Rule and requires disclosure, paragraph (b)(6)
permits the lawyer to make such disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law.”).
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other law.”159 In this instance, Rule 1.4(a)(5) requires the lawyer to explain
to its client its inability to assist.160 Instead of detailing their inability to
serve clients who intended to commit fraud and corruption, Mossack
Fonseca continued to assist in its full capacity. According to Rule 8.4(c),
“[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”161
Moreover, if John Doe, the whistleblower, was a lawyer working
within Mossack Fonseca and was aware “that another lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as
a lawyer,”162 and if he had a license to practice in the United States, then
John Doe would have had a duty to disclose—which he had fulfilled
anonymously.
On the other hand, lawyers employed by organizations, such as inhouse counsels to corporations, have duties that slightly differ from a law
firm lawyer. According to the SEC,—which had adopted a final rule
establishing standards of professional conduct “for attorneys who appear
and practice before the commission on behalf of issuers”—to deter
corporate misconduct and fraud,
Corporate wrongdoers at the lower or middle levels of the corporate
hierarchy will be aware that an attorney who becomes aware of their
misconduct is obligated under the rule to report it up-the-ladder to
the highest levels of the corporation. In the event that wrongdoing or
fraud exists at the highest levels of a corporation, those committing
the misconduct will similarly know that the corporation’s attorneys
are obligated to report any misconduct of which they become aware
up-the-ladder to the corporation’s board and its independent
directors.163

However, it is stipulated in the Model Rules that a lawyer “shall
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization.”164 This objective standard and room for discretion might be a
way for a lawyer to flee from responsibility. For example, “[i]f the
circumstances involve a constituent’s innocent misunderstanding of law and
subsequent acceptance of the lawyer’s advice, the lawyer may reasonably
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(5) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
Id.
161 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
162 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
163
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINAL RULE: IMPLEMENTATION OF STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS, 17 CFR PART 205 (2003)(emphasis added),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm.
164 Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting
Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 1031 (2007);
see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
159
160
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conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the
matter be referred to higher authority.”165 On the other hand, “[i]f the matter
is of sufficient seriousness, . . . referral to higher authority in the
organization may be necessary . . . . [But] [a]ny measures taken should, to
the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to
the representation to persons outside the organization.”166 Although the inhouse lawyer does not have an affirmative duty to report out of the
organization—unless stipulated by laws that supersede the ABA Model
Rules (e.g., SEC, FCPA or other federal laws)—the lawyer may proceed as
reasonably necessary to prevent injury to the organization. This may
involve having to report out of the organization if the lawyer’s efforts to
address the issue with the highest authority who can act on behalf of the
organization fails (e.g., if such authority refuses to act or insists upon a
clear violation of law), and if the harm “might be imputed to the
organization” and would likely “result in substantial injury to the
organization.”167
V.

WHO PAYS THE PRICE?
While the super-rich have benefitted from offshore tax havens and
money laundering schemes, people with low socio-economic backgrounds
are really the ones who have paid the price. Luke Harding, a British
journalist and foreign correspondent for The Guardian, emphasized that
“[t]hose who dutifully paid their taxes, were, in fact, dupes.”168 The citizens
of these countries whose tax receipts have been reduced due to tax
avoidance by the wealthy have caused public funds to also be funneled
out.169 Snowden explains that “[the] trove of leaked data about offshore tax
havens in Panama highlights more than ever the vital role of the
whistleblower in a free society.”170
Obermayer further clarifies, “Africa loses out on twice as much money
through tax evasion as it receives in development aid.”171 Because Africanbased tax evaders have paid very little taxes in their countries, governments
continue to lack money for public programs and are unable to provide
affordable food and clothing.172 The concealment tactics of the offshore
industry have promoted illegal arms trading, drug smuggling, and terrorist
activities.173 “It has [also] led to water scarcity in Spain, child labor in
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
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China, illegal logging in Indonesia, unsafe medicine in Nigeria, and poorly
constructed buildings in Turkey, where collapses have killed people.”174 As
Snowden puts it, “it happens without our knowledge, without our
awareness, without our consent.”175
VI. CHALLENGES TO MOVING FORWARD
Money laundering is a globalized industry. As money laundering and
tax evasion schemes are becoming more and more sophisticated through the
evolution of technology, there also has been quite an evolution in the global
and domestic AML/CTF efforts to curtail financial fraud. We see this in
how various governments and international agencies have responded to the
Panama Papers. However, some of the proposed solutions require
tremendous regulatory costs, which could be a hindrance in countries that
cannot afford it. This includes developing countries where money
laundering is prevalent, yet regulatory resources are in a deficit because
monetary resources are being displaced out of the country as a result of
illegal tax evasion practices by the super-wealthy. Furthermore, most, if not
all, banks “have [AML] systems in place, yet global money laundering
transactions are still estimated at 2 to 5 percent of global GDP.”176 The
bottom line is that money laundering continues to be a complicated issue
for governments and financial institutions to tackle.
A. The False Positives
There are several challenges to the implementation of AML strategies.
In addition to compliance costs, an important challenge is assessing the
efficiency and success of newly implemented AML initiatives. Not only is
money laundering already hard to detect without the help of
whistleblowers, but it is also difficult to evaluate whether these AML
initiatives are, in fact, preventing and catching money laundering schemes.
Larger financial and corporate institutions continuously face the
challenge of keeping up with the evolution of technology. As such,
criminals who are adamant to launder money could find loopholes much
faster than it is for firms and financial institutions to update their outdated
systems. Current AML systems also tend to flag a large number of false
positives, which seems counterproductive and inefficient.177 As Imam

174

Trautman, supra note 55, at 846 (quoting Francis X. Donnelly & Sarah Kellogg,
Understanding Corruption, GEO. WASH. BUS., Fall 2011, at 9).
175 Burgmann, supra note 172.
176 Imam Hoque, Old AML Systems Hinder the Fight Against Financial Crime,
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.corporatecompliance
insights.com/old-aml-systems-hinder-the-fight-against-financial-crime/.
177 Id.
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Hoque178 explains:
Today, 90 to 95 percent of alerts are false positives, yet analysts are
legally obliged to investigate, regardless of legitimacy, due to the
fear of enormous fines and the fact that there is now an increased
drive to hold compliance officers, senior executives and board
members personally liable for failing to have . . . adequate AML
programs in place.179

In an effort to detect illegal activity, financial institutions have
implemented transaction monitoring systems (TMS) to flag suspicious
activities.180 However, “[i]n an attempt to avoid missing any potential
criminal activity, current TMS flag tenuous links,” which ultimately result
in numerous false positives.181
Money laundering analysts become “demotivated and demoralized
from having to check very large numbers of false positives.”182 Focusing
solely on tenuous transactions is also not enough because money laundering
is not about a single transaction, but rather, it involves a sophisticated
network of entities working in concert. “On top of that, these investigations
are labor- and cost-intensive, keeping banks in a vulnerable position as they
continue to waste time investigating false positives and making it more
difficult to spot cases of true illegal activity.”183
B. “Know Your Customer” & Know Your Employees
Money laundering involves a complex web of entities—from
inconspicuous individuals to shell companies. In addition to tracking
financial transactions, there also has been a focus on detecting entities that
might be linked to money laundering schemes or criminal networks.
Improving due diligence procedures and implementing “Know Your
Customer” (KYC) initiatives are some of the most important types of
internal reform. Since 1998, “[t]he Americans had systematically fought
against adopting the KYC principles because it was widely believed that
they represented too great a degree of invasion of the principles of personal
privacy.”184 Although most firms in the United States now conduct some
form of due diligence about their current and potential clients, it has not
178 See id., (“Imam Hoque is the COO & Head of Product at Quantexa. He has spent 29
years in the IT services and software industry and now specializes in large data-driven AI
solutions with a focus on financial crime and network analytics.”).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181
Id.
182 Dionysios S. Demetis, Fighting Money Laundering with Technology: A Case Study of
Bank X in the UK, 105 DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 96, 99 (2018).
183 Hoque, supra note 176.
184 Rowan Bosworth-Davies, Money Laundering - Chapter 3, 10.1 J. OF MONEY
LAUNDERING CONTROL 47, 57 (2007).

114

How Countries Seek to Strengthen Anti-Money Laundering Laws
40:87 (2019)

always been effective.
Improving due diligence efforts becomes a challenge when it could
come at the expense of losing a potential client, especially when demanding
information that they do not want to share. As Megan M. Brooks, a
financial risk manager for Capstone Associated Services, Ltd., had put it,
“[d]e-risking has led some institutions to opt-out of long-term relationships
with clients deemed ‘high-risk’.”185 Because banks have to conduct more
intensive due diligence of potential clients, “[q]uestions have become more
intrusive, even to go as far in some cases to research bills of lading to
ensure the source of funds. Banks are now following the ‘Know Your
Customer’s Customer’ mantra, due to increased regulation.”186 A procedure
of this kind might be more exhaustive, but it could also be a detriment to
the business as a whole, especially if it deters clients from working with
you.
Furthermore, gathering information about a client is not the only
priority; due diligence on employees should also be improved. While it is
typical to do a standard background check on employees and performance
reviews, perhaps having annual diligence reports may help deter
malpractice. These reports would not just be about the quality of their work,
but also about the types of work being done using company assets. This
could include information and work conducted on a company’s laptop, or
purchases made using company’s assets, such as travel reimburses or taking
clients out for dinner. While the awareness of being supervised could
discourage illegal behavior and malpractice, it might also negatively affect
an employee’s confidence and relationship with the company. This also
could be a violation of privacy or labor law even if it is fairly or equally
enforced to every employee in the firm.
C. Formation of Shell Companies
In addition to firms’ internal due diligence efforts, the government
should also improve efforts in identifying criminal or shell entities. In the
United States, individual states govern the formation of companies. A
corporation is formed by filing the Articles of Incorporation (AOI), also
known as a Charter, with the Secretary of State. Each state has minimum
filing requirements, but, generally, state corporate law has become less
restrictive over time. In most states, corporations are now permitted to
incorporate for any purpose. In addition, the powers of corporate board of
directors and officers have been enhanced, especially when the court gives
deference to the business judgment rule.
The same leeway is given in the formation of Limited Liability
185

Megan M. Brooks, Overcoming Bank Over-Regulation Hassles, CAPSTONE
ASSOCIATED SERVICES (Dec. 2015), https://www.capstoneassociated.com/pdfs/bank-over
regulation-captives.pdf.
186 Id.
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Companies (LLCs). To form an LLC, Articles of Organization also need to
be filed with the secretary of state. Because each state has its own
requirements, tax-evaders and money launderers choose to create their shell
companies in states that are not so strict. The “[s]tates of Nevada, Wyoming
and Delaware, . . . allow for the quick creation of [LLCs] without
identifying the true beneficial owners.”187
Perhaps the office of the Secretary of State could start conducting due
diligence work on the directors and officers listed in newly filed AOIs.
Having a due diligence process could help restrict the formation of shell
companies in tax-haven states like Nevada and Florida. However, aside
from regulatory and enforcement costs, adding extra layers to the process
(e.g., a screening process) can have real economic implications;
complicating the process can easily disincentivize the formation of new
businesses.
D. Transnational Cooperation & Information Sharing
Money laundering does not only thrive on transactional opacity, but
also through anonymity—hiding the identities of all parties involved by
using a complex web of entities that are usually based in different countries.
Transnational cooperation, similar to what the European Union has
established in response to the Panama Papers, could be an effective way to
hone in on tax-evaders.
Through cross-border cooperation and the sharing of information,
participating countries could better track the outward flow of capital. While
it has not yet been adequately tested, the motive for having a mode for
transnational information sharing is to create a more efficient and
streamlined process in the investigation of potential fraudsters and
malpractice. “According to the OECD, for example, automatic exchanges
of bulk taxpayer information are the most effective way to help assist tax
authorities with enforcing their cross-border tax laws.”188 “Third party
reporting and tax-withholding disclosures can provide information to tax
authorities to allow them to better gauge risks of offshore tax evasion and
aggressive international tax planning.”189 However, while some countries
grant their government with direct access to taxpayer information, others do
not.
“In countries such as the United States and Canada, privacy interests
are additionally protected by constitutional guarantees that cannot generally
be violated by state action (e.g., the right to be free from an improper search
or seizure).”190 There is also a concern for data security, especially since the
187

Hardy, supra note 30.
Arthur J. Cockfield, How Countries Should Share Tax Information, 50 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1091, 1109 (2017).
189 Id. at 1110.
190 Id. at 1117; see generally Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of
188
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IRS “experiences one million attempts every week to hack its information
technology systems.”191 The misuse of information is also a valid concern.
In addition to tax-holder information, disclosures about the beneficial
owners of offshore assets, along with the amount and nature of offshore
investments facilitated by offshore financial intermediaries, are also
valuable. However, many countries are reluctant to fully participate in the
automatic exchange of information due to concerns about privacy law and
national security. Other countries simply cannot afford the regulatory and
enforcement costs.
Additional challenges include the quality and reliability of information
shared. Several countries, especially tax havens, “simply do not track these
tax information sources” and, therefore, “they are unable to exchange this
information when called upon to do so.”192 As Arthur Cockfield, a professor
at Queen’s University Faculty of Law in Canada explained:
As revealed by an analysis of tax haven data leaks, a major
vulnerability in these efforts is the lack of reporting by hundreds of
offshore service providers, such as trust, finance, or other financial
service providers based in tax havens. In many cases, these offshore
service providers at times did not report accurate tax and financial
information on cross-border investments as required by FATF [the
Financial Action Task Force] recommendations. Noncompliance
resulted from a lack of due diligence, willful neglect, and legal
insulation through indemnification agreements between the offshore
service provider and the nonresident investor.193

Because information shared may not be accurate, the recipient of
offshore data will have to cross-reference the reported inflow and outflow
of capital with the alleged source (i.e., other financial institutions that the
offshore service provider had allegedly engaged with).
Tom Keatinge, a former investment banker and the director of the
Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at the Royal United
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 45 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1121 (2002).
191 Id. at 1116, referencing Steve R. Johnson, The Future of American Tax
Administration: Conceptual Alternatives and Political Realities, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 5, 17
(2016).
192 Id. at 1111.
193 Id. at 1113, referencing Arthur J. Cockfield, Big Data and Tax Haven Secrecy, 12
FLA. TAX REV. 483, 519-522 (2016). See generally, The Financial Action Task Force, THE
FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/
international/financial-action-task-force(last visited Mar. 15, 2019)(“The Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental policymaking body whose purpose is to
establish international standards, and to develop and promote policies, both at national and
international levels, to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. It was
formed in 1989 to set out measures to be taken in the fight against money laundering. Since
then, the FATF has issued 40 recommendations to fight money laundering and 9 special
recommendations to fight terrorist financing.”).
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Services Institute, explains that money laundering thrives as a globalized
industry; borders are immaterial when structuring these types of taxevading transactions, yet “borders are not immaterial for the cops who are
trying to chase you.”194 While the ideas of transnational cooperation and the
sharing of information sound ideal, there are so many challenges that need
to be resolved before implementation begins. A robust system would have
to be in place to ensure that financial information of citizens is properly
protected. As such, regulatory and enforcement costs would be quite high,
especially because of the man-power required to verify whether the
information provided by another country is accurate; there needs to be a
way to ensure that the data has not been altered. As Keatinge expressed,
information gathering and sharing are not enough; “[w]e know that
supervision doesn’t get the bad guys . . . . It’s investigation that gets the bad
guys.”195
E. Captive Entities
Another area that has not received much attention is captive entities. A
“captive” is defined as “an institution intended to provide services to a
promoter and his/her associates”; it is a subsidiary company for one parent
company or a group of companies, and is usually located in offshore tax
havens.196 There are different kinds of captive entities. The most common
type is captive insurance companies.
A captive insurance company is a wholly owned subsidiary company
that provides risk-mitigation services for its parent company or a
group of related companies . . . . The tax concept of a captive
insurance company is relatively simple. The parent company pays
insurance premiums to its captive insurance company and seeks to
deduct these premiums in its home country, often a high-tax
jurisdiction. A parent company will [therefore] locate the captive
insurance company in tax havens, such as Bermuda and the Cayman
Islands to avoid adverse tax implications. Today, several states in the
US allow the formation of captive companies. The protection from
tax assessment is a sought-after benefit for the parent company.197

While legitimately formed captive entities are legal, the United States
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) “has continually listed certain small captive
(microcaptive) insurance arrangements on its ‘Dirty Dozen’ list of tax194 Juliette Garside, Is Money-Laundering Scandal at Danske Bank the Largest in
History?,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
21,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2018/sep/21/is-money-laundering-scandal-at-danske-bank-the-largest-in-history.
195 Id.
196 Captive Bank Law and Legal Definition. US LEGAL INC., https://definitions.
uslegal.com/c/captive-bank/.
197 Julia Kagan, Captive Insurance Company, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 16, 2018), https:
//www.investopedia.com/terms/c/captive-insurance-company.asp.
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abusive transactions . . . [since] the premiums paid in captive arrangements
are often not legitimate ordinary and necessary business expenses.”198
Although there are hardly any reported instances of captive companies
being used for money laundering, captives are more susceptible to the risk
of fraudulent activities—including money laundering and terrorist
financing. “Money laundering using reinsurance could occur either by
establishing fictitious reinsurance companies or reinsurance intermediaries,
fronting arrangements and captives, or by misusing the normal reinsurance
transactions.”199 Having independent intermediaries, which captive entities
lack, play an important role in deterring money laundering activities.
“The Cayman Islands [mere 22 miles in length] are the second-largest
captive insurance jurisdiction in the world.”200 As of December 31, 2018,
the Cayman Islands had a total of 703 active captives.201 In addition, “the
total value of premiums in Cayman’s international insurance industry was
$15.4 billion, up from $12.4 billion in 2017, and the total assets over $68.7
billion, up from $61 billion in 2017.”202 In general terms, the Cayman
Islands
offers a low-tax, regulation-light environment for financial players
from around the world, particularly Europe and the United States. In
terms of its ratio of GDP to foreign assets, Cayman is the most
intensive offshore financial [center] in the world, with foreign assets
at 1,500 times the size of the domestic economy.203

Over the past decade, and especially after the Panama Papers, there
has been a heightened level of AML/CTF initiatives that have impacted
both the banking and captive industries. “For captives domiciled offshore,
some institutions deny captive bank account applications without even
reading through the application; namely UBS and Royal Bank of
198 Philip Garrett Panitz, Captive Insurance: Avoiding the Risks, J. OF ACCT. (June 1,
2018),
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2018/jun/captive-insurance-entities.
html. Philip Garrett Panitz, Esq., LL.M., is the senior tax partner at the law firm Panitz &
Kossoff LLP.
199 Haemala Thanasegaran & Bala Shanmugam, Exploitation of the Insurance Industry
for Money Laundering: The Malaysian Perspective, 11.J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL
135, 138 (2008).
200 The Cayman Islands as a Captive Domicile: An Introduction, CAPTIVE INSURANCE
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Canada.”204 This obstacle stems from the increased pressure on banks to
“Know Your Customer.” As so, financial institutions domiciled onshore are
reluctant to take on potential offshore clients that might be “high-risk” for
money laundering.
On May 1, 2017, the United Kingdom (UK) had adopted “an
amendment to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill” which
would require the 14 British overseas territories, including the Cayman
Islands, to introduce public registers of beneficial ownership by the end of
year 2020.205 The Cayman Islands Ministry of Financial Services was not
pleased with this requirement and indicated that if necessary, the
government will challenge this requirement in the “Cayman Islands courts
through an order in council.”206 The Ministry had stated that “a public
register will not be introduced in the Cayman Islands until such registers are
adopted as a global standard. [So far, only] EU countries are required to
introduce public registers by 2020, under the [fifth amended] AMLD.”207
Furthermore, the Cayman Islands government argued that having
public registers of beneficial ownership conflict with the Cayman Islands
Constitution, “which provides a positive obligation on the Government to
protect a person’s legitimate need for privacy with regard to their financial
affairs.”208 The Ministry of Financial Services asserts that:
The Cayman Islands Government has long [recognized] the
importance of maintaining beneficial ownership information,
compiling this information on a private register with information
only made available to law enforcement agencies upon request to
satisfy their legitimate needs for access, such as to carry out a law
enforcement investigation . . . . The Cayman Islands takes its place
as a leader in global finance very seriously and [recognizes] that
beneficial ownership information – not provided publicly, but rather
through proper legal channels to relevant authorities – does support
the global fight against financial crimes.209

While the Cayman Islands government has been slowly chipping on its
wall of secrecy to keep up with international AML pressures, it is difficult
to ignore that the territory’s economy does rely heavily on its
204
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confidentiality laws. It is one of the most popular financial centers in the
world because it allows companies to be easily formed while providing
both asset protection and financial privacy protection. The international
concern here is the fact that having a wall of secrecy to protect beneficial
ownership information attracts potential money launderers who thrive on
anonymity and opacity.
In addition to captive insurance companies, the Cayman Islands also
prospers from the financial industry. With “banking assets worth US $1.026
trillion in June 2017,” the Cayman Islands is the eighth biggest banking
center in the world.210 Similar to captive insurance companies, there are
also captive banks.
Usually, a captive bank is wholly owned subsidiary of a
multinational group of companies. The purpose of a captive bank is
to provide banking service to the group or to the parent organization.
A captive bank works only for the parent, its customers and
suppliers. In order to avail low capital requirements and freedom
from exchange control, captive banks are usually located in a tax
haven. Services provided by a captive bank include safe keeping of
deposits, merchant banking, financing, and other services in
association with commercial banks.211

Since captive entities function as subsidiaries of another, usually a
non-bank institution, and since they often operate in tax havens like the
Cayman Islands, their activities are not very transparent. Perhaps in the
wake of the Panama Papers, UK officials thought that focusing on captive
and offshore entities and forcing them to disclose beneficial ownership
information would disincentivize money laundering that is drawn to
anonymity.
There has been a consistent evolution of AML initiatives to confront
the wall of secrecy in tax havens. To tackle the issue of money laundering,
effort and cooperation is required from all valuable players:
intergovernmental/transnational collaborations, onshore firms conducting
KYC due diligence work, and offshore entities disclosing beneficial
ownership information. The parent companies that are domiciled in non-tax
haven countries should be required to disclose information about their
subsidiaries that are domiciled in tax-havens. Without cross-border
collaboration and cooperation, efforts in preventing money laundering and
tax evasion schemes that thrive from a transnational network of anonymous
entities would almost be futile.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Journalists risked their lives to achieve transparency. Some have
already been killed for it.212 Each of the 400+ journalists from over eighty
countries who unveiled the truth behind the Panama Papers knew about this
risk. They understood that by participating in the investigation, they “stood
between rule of law and those who sought to violate it.”213 One of the
investigative journalists of the Panama Papers was killed in Malta by a car
bomb. Daphne Caruana Galizia was investigating several Maltese
politicians and had discovered offshore ties to the Maltese Prime Minister
Joseph Muscat’s inner circle.214 Daphne’s sister, Corinne Vella, explains
that “[t]hey wanted to shut her up . . . . She obviously spoke truth to power.
That was threatening to people in power.” 215
The Panama Papers unveiled how the most privileged and powerful
people in the world have been operating by a different set of rules. We need
to develop a culture of transparency and accountability to protect our basic
freedoms. “Developing a culture of transparency and accountability, where
we not only know what [the] government is doing, but recognize that we
have not just the right but the responsibility to actually act in changing the
nature of government, . . . directly holds these individuals to account.”216
After all, “the ones who pay the price for the tax haven model are the
citizens of all the countries whose tax receipts are reduced due to the
activities of shell companies, or whose public funds are funneled out of the
country and stashed away in the Caribbean.”217
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